Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Twodimensional semantics: Twodimensional are semantics that take into account both the properties of a situation described by a statement and the properties of the utterance situation (which need not be identical with the described situation). For example, the statement that one is at location A, B or C is true when it is uttered at location A, B or C (diagonalization). Statements of a particular form are always true, e.g. "I am here now". In this case, the entire two-dimensional matrix is assigned the value "true". Two-dimensional semantics go back to D. Kaplan (D. Kaplan, Demonstratives, in Perry & Wettstein (Eds.) Themes from Kaplan, Oxford, 1989, pp. 481-563). See also context/context dependency, diagonalization, diagonal propositions, A-intensions, C-intensions, Stalnaker intensions, character, content._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Robert Stalnaker on Twodimensional Semantics - Dictionary of Arguments
I 17 Twodimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: Twodimensional semantics connects propositional thoughts with sentences, (s) i.e. that in a different possible world something else can be meant with the same expressions. The A-intension (independent of possible worlds) is then usually the only one to which the speaker has cognitive access. >Intensions/Stalnaker. Epistemological status: the epistemological status is therefore determined by the modal state of the A-intension. ((s) What can be known depends on the proposition (content) of the possible world-independent expression). I 18 Twodimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: twodimensional semantics can show how the possible and the true interact, i.e. separate semantic questions from factual ones in the context. I 19 But it does not provide a context-free canonical language in which we could provide a neutral view of the possibility space. I 192 Def contingent a priori/twodimensional semantics/Stalnaker: contingent a priori is a statement with a contingent secondary intension but not necessarily a primary one. Def necessary a posteriori: other way round: necessary a posteriori is a necessary secondary intension, contingent primary. >Terminology/Stalnaker. Important argument: no proposition is itself contingent a priori or necessary a posteriori. There are only different ways in which necessary and contingent propositions are associated with statements. Def Character/Kaplan: character corresponds to meaning. It is the function of possible (use) contexts on references. >Character/Kaplan. External: Newen/Schrenk: the character is the whole table of two-dimensional semantics. Kaplan: thesis: character and content must be separated. Character/meaning: character provides a rule that says how the reference is determined by facts about the context. Content/Kaplan: content corresponds to the secondary intension. >Content/Kaplan. Content: content is possibly unknown despite language skills. ((s) E.g. Two omniscient gods). >Two omniscient Gods. Character/(s):a character is e.g. who it could be in each case. Content: the content says who it actually is, e.g. to whom "I" refers. I 194 Content/secondary intension: content can be different in different possible worlds a) because the context is different and b) because the meaning is different. ((s) This is part of meta-semantics). >Terminology/Stalnaker. I 199 Twodimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: twodimensional semantics should be interpreted meta-semantically, not semantically. I 199 Meta-Semantics/Stalnaker: meta-semantics is fact dependent, therefore it does not give access to a priori truth. Semantics: semantics must assume internal states. I 212 Twodimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: primary propositions are the ones that represent the cognitive values ​​of our thoughts. Secondary propositions/semantic: for Stalnaker, the secondary propositions are described and not expressed. Secondary proposition/semantic: secondary propositions are unambiguously defined as a function of the facts. Problem: they are not something to which we have cognitive access._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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> Counter arguments against Stalnaker
> Counter arguments in relation to Twodimensional Semantics
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27